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I. INTRODUCTION
The most fundamental obligation of all entities and individuals licensed by
the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or "Commission") is to
serve the "public interest."' While this term is ill-defined, when dealing with
broadcast licensees, the Commission has traditionally placed a heavy emphasis
on the pursuit of "localism"-the notion that broadcasters have a special re-
sponsibility to their particular communities of license (i.e., the station's poten-
tial listeners).2 Because broadcasters have a strong obligation to their local
communities, one might argue that (1) local residents are uniquely benefited or
harmed by the behavior of broadcasters and the Commission's regulation of
that behavior; and (2) local residents have special incentives to prosecute the
rights of the larger "public" in order to secure the unique advantages or avoid
the unique harms to which they are subject.
Beginning in the 1960s, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
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University Law School, J.D., 1976. Mr. Gottfried has extensive experience handling com-
plex commercial litigation, frequently relating to communications issues at both the trial and
appellate levels. In this capacity, he has often litigated the "listener standing" issues raised
in this article, including in the Rainbow/PUSH litigation detailed herein.
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New York University School of Law, J.D., 2004; Harvard University Kennedy School of
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The Federal Communications Commission largely enforces a broadcast station's
obligations to its community of license through the use of its public interest standard. For
the Commission to grant, transfer, modify, or renew a broadcast license, it must establish
that the "public interest, convenience, or necessity will be served thereby." 47 U.S.C. §§
307(a), 309(k)(l)(A), 3 10(d) (2000).
2 See, e.g., In re Broadcast Localism, Notice of Inquiry, 19 F.C.C.R. 12,425 (July 7,
2004).
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lumbia Circuit ("D.C. Circuit" or "court") used these two arguments to estab-
lish the doctrine of listener standing. As originally fashioned, this doctrine con-
ferred automatic judicial standing on the residents of a station's community of
license to appeal Commission decisions concerning that station's license. The
D.C. Circuit's seminal 1966 decision in United Church of Christ v. FCC' an-
nounced that broad listener standing is necessary "[i]n order to safeguard the
public interest in broadcasting."4 Twenty-two years later in Llerandi v. FCC,5
the D.C. Circuit reaffirmed this public interest rationale for listener standing,
declaring that "[l]isteners are, by definition, 'injured' when licenses are issued
in contravention" of Commission policy.'
United Church of Christ and Llerandi appeared to firmly establish listener
standing as a distinct creature of constitutional law, peculiar to challenges to
FCC broadcast decisions. However, the Supreme Court's 1992 decision in
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife7 provided substantial reason to doubt the contin-
ued viability of the doctrine. In Lujan, the Court explicitly rejected the public
interest rationale for Article III standing. The Court established that before
standing could be conferred on any given party, that party would be required to
establish that (1) it had suffered injury in fact; (2) the injury in fact had been
caused by the party and practice at issue in the case; and (3) the injury in fact
was redressable by judicial action
Without the public interest rationale upon which both United Church of
Christ and Llerandi were premised, one might expect that listener standing
would promptly disappear. Nevertheless, even after Lujan, the D.C. Circuit has
demonstrated a lingering allegiance to the doctrine, and has continued to cite
both United Church of Christ and Llerandi as good law. At the same time, the
D.C. Circuit has continuously distinguished United Church of Christ and Ller-
andi on their facts, thereby rendering the listener standing doctrine inapplicable
in an ever-widening variety of contexts. Thus, while Lujan did not eliminate
listener standing, it did transform listener standing into an almost unrecogniz-
able form.
Listener standing is not only a substantively interesting doctrine in its own
right, but it also provides a particularly vivid illustration of the efforts to which
a court may go to avoid overturning its own precedent. The D.C. Circuit is re-
puted to have a deeply institutionalized reverence for its own precedent, par-
ticularly in its areas of expertise, such as administrative law. The court's treat-
ment of listener standing may well be an example of this deep-seated jurispru-
3 359 F.2d 994, 1005 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
4 Id.
5 863 F.2d 79, 85 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
6 Id.
7 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
8 Id. at 560-6 1.
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dential tendency.
In this article, we argue that the retention of the listener standing doctrine
cannot be justified under Lujan. As a result, the D.C. Circuit's inexplicable
refusal to explicitly overturn United Church of Christ and Lierandi is mis-
guided. Even if one believes that the recognition of listener standing is good
policy, it is indisputable that the courts lack the constitutional authority to ef-
fect that policy. The D.C. Circuit's refusal to overturn its precedent in light of
Lujan delays the inevitable while undermining the integrity of the court's ju-
risprudence.
II. EARLY CONCEPTIONS OF LISTENER STANDING: UNITED
CHURCH OF CHRIST AND ITS PROGENY
Article Ill of the U.S. Constitution limits both the substantive scope of the
cases that federal courts may hear as well as the specific litigants that may
bring those cases.9 Critically, the judicial power extends only to cases and con-
troversies.' This limitation on the courts' jurisdiction cabins the judiciary's
ability to render advisory opinions or to otherwise assume the policymaking
functions of the legislative and executive branches." The courts themselves
have repeatedly acted to limit the scope of their jurisdiction; beginning with
Marbury v. Madision,2 the courts have used Article III to avoid a number of
cases that would have embroiled the judiciary in thorny political debates. The
use of such "passive virtues,"' 3 as they have been named by constitutional
scholar Alexander Bickel, have helped to maintain the legitimacy, and thus
efficacy, of the courts. 4
One of the most frequently used "passive virtues" is the doctrine of stand-
ing, which defines and limits the particular litigants that may bring a given is-
sue before the courts. 5 The standing doctrine ensures that litigating parties
have a sufficiently particularized stake in the issues to be litigated such that
9 U.S. CONST. art. II1, § 2, cl. 1.
0 Id.
I The legislative and executive branches are more accountable to the public and thus
the more "democratic" loci of the policymaking function. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL.,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 85 (4th ed. 2001) ("By limiting the occasions for judicial intervention
into legislative or executive processes, the case or controversy requirement reduces the fric-
tion between the branches produced by judicial review. This rationale is often tied to a con-
cern with the countermajoritarian difficulty.").
12 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (cementing the judiciary's power of judicial review by refusing to
exercise that power for lack of jurisdiction).
13 ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 111-98 (2d ed. 1986).
'4 Id.
15 Id. at 116-27. Standing is distinct from the limitations imposed through subject mat-




judicial consideration of those issues does not infringe upon the policymaking
functions of the legislative or executive branches. 6 Through standing, the
courts have acted to preserve the separation of powers among the three federal
branches. '"
The applicability of Article III to administrative agencies is less certain, if
only because the constitutional classification of administrative agencies has
always been less than clear. Agencies are strange hybrids of legislative, judi-
cial, and executive functions; they promulgate rules, settle disputes, and en-
force regulations.'8 Notwithstanding, in the early history of the administrative
state, courts tended to focus on the quasi-judicial functions of the administra-
tive agency, and thus treated agency standing and judicial standing as cotermi-
nous concepts.'9 Consequently, the range of parties who could initiate a dispute
before an agency was limited.
The FCC was no exception to this rule. Prior to 1966, the Commission ac-
corded standing in non-rulemaking proceedings to an extremely narrow class
of entities and individuals. Only those parties that had suffered direct economic
injury or electrical interference were permitted to intervene in ongoing FCC
proceedings." As a result, the Commission's administrative process was
"closed" and markedly different from the relatively "open" administrative
mechanisms used today.
Only against this backdrop can one appreciate the full impact of the D.C.
Circuit's decision in United Church of Christ." Despite its later influence on
the judicial standing doctrine, United Church of Christ actually centered on the
scope of entities and individuals that could properly claim administrative
standing before the FCC.2 WLBT, a television station located in Jackson, Mis-
sissippi, had filed an application to renew its license before the FCC. A number
of local residents and organizations, including the United Church of Christ,
filed petitions to deny WLBT's application. In its petition, the United Church
of Christ established a substantial record of malfeasance on the part of the li-
censee, including a long history of discriminatory conduct.23
16 See Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 125 (1940).
17 Id. at 131-32.
18 This is particularly true for independent agencies. See STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 38 (5th ed. 2002).
19 See Dep't of Labor v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 514 U.S. 122
(1995).
20 See FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940) (dealing with economic
injury); Nat'l Broad. Co. v. FCC, 132 F.2d 545 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (dealing with electrical
interference).
21 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
22 The court and the parties apparently assumed, with little note, that agency standing
and judicial standing were coextensive concepts. See id at 1000 n.8.
23 id. at 998.
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The United Church of Christ asserted standing because two of its members
lived within WLBT's broadcast area. The Church argued that these members
(1) were directly harmed by WLBT's failure to fulfill its obligations under the
then-effective Fairness Doctrine by affording these members the opportunity to
respond to on-air discriminatory statements; (2) represented the interests of
other members of the sizable minority community, which also had been denied
a voice by WLBT's actions; and (3) represented the entire audience, which had
been denied balanced reporting and programming by WLBT's actions. 4 Not-
withstanding these claims, the Commission dismissed the United Church of
Christ's petition for lack of standing, finding that petitioners could "assert no




On appeal, the D.C. Circuit rejected the Commission's narrow reading of
administrative standing requirements. Noting that "neither administrative nor
judicial concepts of standing have been static[J"26 the court effected a funda-
mental shift in focus from the private interests of the petitioners to their ability
to effectuate the public interest. The court focused less on the direct harm suf-
fered by the petitioners than on the "representational" role these petitioners
served in filing their petition to deny, stating that "standing is accorded not for
the protection of [petitioners'] private interest but only to vindicate the public
interest."27 The court further opined that
[t]he Commission's rigid adherence to a requirement of direct economic injury in the
commercial sense ... denies standing to spokesmen for the listeners, who are most directly
concerned with and intimately affected by the performance of a licensee. Since the concept
of standing is a practical and functional one designed to insure that only those with a genu-
ine and legitimate interest can participate in a proceeding, we can see no reason to exclude
those with such an obvious and acute concern as the listening audience.
2 8
The court also noted that denying standing to members of the public would
render many of the Commission's rules toothless: "unless the listeners-the
broadcast consumers---can be heard, there may be no one to bring program-
ming deficiencies or offensive overcommercialization to the attention of the
Commission in an effective manner."29 Thus, for practical reasons, standing
had to be expanded to include listeners, lest judicial review become ineffec-
tive. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied heavily on its precedent in
other consumer contexts, noting that it had previously allowed consumers to
oppose administrative actions affecting products as varied as coal and oleo-
margarine.3" Broadcasting was just another product and listeners were just an-
24 Id. at 998-99.
25 Id. at 999.
26 Id. at 1000.
27 Id. at 1001.
28 Id. at 1002.
29 Id. at 1004-05.
30 Id. at 1002.
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other class of consumers.3'
Thus, United Church of Christ broadened the scope of parties that could
claim standing before both the FCC and the courts. However, the court did not
require the Commission to confer standing on every member of the listening
public. Instead, the court found that "[t]he Commission should be accorded
broad discretion in establishing and applying rules for such public participation
..... [while t]he usefulness of any particular petitioner for intervention must
be judged in relation to other petitioners and the nature of the claims it asserts
as [a] basis for standing.""2 In other words, even within the broader sweep of
the opinion, the court endorsed an unspecified limiting principle that would
confer standing only on particular members of the listening public.
While United Church of Christ represented a turning point in the broadcast
context, it was only one of a number of standing cases that transformed the
doctrine in the 1960s. In various contexts, the courts conferred broad standing
on members of the public, often grounding such standing in prudential consid-
erations.33 By refusing to adopt rigid standing rules based on constitutional
considerations during this period, the Supreme Court afforded itself, and the
lower federal courts, flexibility to deal with standing on a case-by-case basis
where compelling policy reasons existed.34 This flexibility allowed the courts
to confer standing, for example, upon displaced urban residents,35 environ-
mental advocates,36 and, of course, broadcast listeners.
III. LISTENER STANDING MATURES
A. The Development of Injury in Fact and the Rejection of Prudential Standing
Although courts conferred broad standing in a variety of contexts throughout
the 1960s, by 1970, the Supreme Court had begun to narrow the scope of
standing by grounding the doctrine more directly in Article III. 37 Instead of its
previously loose interpretation of the standing doctrine, the Court began to es-
tablish fixed criteria by which the adequacy of a party's standing could be as-
31 Id.
32 Id. at 1005-06.
33 See, e.g., Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 932-37 (2d Cir.
1968); Scenic Hudson Pres. Conf. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608, 615-17 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
34 Some scholars have suggested that courts were eager to expand standing to appeal
administrative decisions because of concerns about agency inaction and agency "capture"
by business interests. See Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits,
"Injuries, " and Article 111, 91 MICH. L. REv. 163, 183-84 (1992).
35 Norwalk CORE, 395 F.2d at 936.
36 Scenic Hudson Pres. Conf., 354 F.2d at 616-17.
37 See supra Part 11.
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sessed for constitutional purposes. This process began in earnest in Ass'n of
Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp," ("Data Processing") in
which the Court clarified that standing required a showing of injury in fact.
In Data Processing, the petitioners, who provided business typing services,
challenged a ruling by the Comptroller General allowing national banks to
compete in the data entry market.39 The petitioners' standing to appeal that rul-
ing was challenged. Although the Court held that the petitioners had standing,
it also found that in determining whether a dispute constitutes a case or contro-
versy sufficient to satisfy Article III, "[t]he first question is whether the plain-
tiff alleges that the challenged action has caused him injury in fact, economic
or otherwise."4 In other words, plaintiffs could not claim standing to sue
merely because they disliked a particular policy or could hypothesize some
uncertain harm that might occur as a result of that policy in the future. Ulti-
mately, the Court found that the petitioners satisfied the injury in fact require-
ment because of the likelihood that they would lose future profits if national
banks were allowed to provide data processing services.4 Regardless, the
Court had taken a decisive step in reinterpreting the meaning and role of stand-
ing in the constitutional scheme.
The Court elaborated on the injury in fact requirement in Sierra Club v.
Morton.42 Sierra Club arose after the U.S. Forest Service approved a proposal
by the Walt Disney Company for the construction of a $35 million dollar resort
complex in the Mineral King Valley.43 The Sierra Club--ne of the nation's
leading environmental protection groups-sued claiming that the proposed
development would violate several statutes and irreparably harm the environ-
ment." The district court granted a preliminary injunction to halt construction.
The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that the Sierra Club had no standing to
sue.
45
On certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's holding that
the Sierra Club could not demonstrate that it would suffer any direct harm.
38 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
39 Id. at 151.
40 Id. at 152.
41 Id. Data Processing also contains a second portion of the standing analysis-the
"zone of interests" test. This second test asks whether the zone of the applicable statute en-
compasses the action complained of by the petitioner. In Data Processing, this second "zone
of interests" test leaned "toward [the] enlargement of the class of people who may protest
administrative action." Id. at 154. However, Data Processing had the net effect of narrow-
ing the standing doctrine through its holding that injury in fact was necessary.
42 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
43 Mineral King Valley is adjacent to the Sequoia National Park and has been a part of
the National Forest since 1926. The opinion states that the valley "is an area of great natural
beauty nestled in the Sierra Nevada Mountains." Id. at 728.
44 Id. at 729-30.
45 Id. at 73 1.
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Whereas Data Processing established that injury in fact required actual injury,
the Court in Sierra Club clarified an additional requirement: that actual injury
must be specific to the plaintiff. The Court held that "[t]he injury in fact test
requires more than an injury to a cognizable interest. It requires that the party
seeking review to be himself among the injured."46 The Court concluded that
the Sierra Club failed to allege that any of its members would be affected in
their "activities or pastimes" by the Disney development especially considering
that the group did not even allege that any of its members had ever used Min-
eral King Valley.47 Thus, while the Court recognized the growing non-
economic forms of harm, such as ecological harm, the Court ruled that "broad-
ening the categories of injury that may be alleged in support of standing is a
different matter from abandoning the requirement that the party seeking review
must himself have suffered an injury."48
In both Data Processing and Sierra Club, the Court implicitly grounded the
injury in fact requirement in the broader Article III case or controversy re-
quirement, which limits the courts' jurisdiction to actual disputes between liti-
gating parties. The Court established this link more directly in Valley Forge
Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State.49 In
Valley Forge, the Court explicitly refused to transform the judiciary into a de-
bate society for the public at large, finding that
[w]ere the federal courts merely publicly funded forums for the ventilation of public griev-
ances for the refinement of jurisprudential understanding, the concept of "standing" would
be quite unnecessary. But the "cases and controversies" language of Art. III forecloses the
conversion of courts of the United States into judicial versions of college debating forums..
. . The exercise of judicial power, which can so profoundly affect the lives, liberty, and
property of those to whom it extends, is therefore restricted to the litigants who can show
"injury in fact" resulting from the action which they seek to have the court adjudicate.
5 °
By the 1980s, the contours of the constitutional injury in fact requirement
were, if not fully specified, present in at least their broad outline: Data Proc-
essing established the need for actual or imminent injury, Sierra Club estab-
lished the need for particularized injury, and Valley Forge grounded the basis
for these qualifications firmly in Article IIl." Cumulatively, these cases ap-
peared to defeat the public enforcement model upon which the listener stand-
ing doctrine had been premised in United Church of Christ.2 However, listener
46 Id. at 734-35.
47 Id. at 735.
48 Id. at 738. Cf United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures,
412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973) ("Here, by contrast, the appellees claimed that the specific and
allegedly illegal action of the Commission would directly harm them in their use of the
natural resources of the Washington Metropolitan Area.").
49 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
50 Id. at 473.
51 See discussion supra Part It.
52 See discussion supra Part II.
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standing would prove strangely resilient throughout the 1980s.11
B. The D.C. Circuit Reaffirms the Viability of Listener Standing
Despite the Supreme Court's efforts to limit the scope of those parties who
might properly be afforded standing under Article I1I by requiring a showing
of injury in fact, the doctrine of listener standing persisted. Thus, courts con-
tinued to allow members of the public to challenge the actions of the FCC un-
der the doctrine of listener standing. These courts did not seek to reform the
listener standing doctrine in light of the Supreme Court's decisions in Data
Processing, Sierra Club, and Valley Forge. Rather, the courts apparently em-
braced a theory of broadcast exceptionalism, placing listeners beyond the
realm of ordinary Article III standing requirements. In practice, the courts con-
ferred broad listener standing to permit members of the public to allege viola-
tions of the Commission's Fairness Doctrine,54 political rules,55 obscenity and
indecency rules,56 and to involve the courts in virtually every other situation
involving broadcast programming regulation.
For example, Maier v. FCC arose after WTMJ-AM, a Milwaukee radio sta-
tion, aired a station editorial criticizing Maier, the city's mayor, and then re-
fused to grant Maier's demand for a half-hour of response time. Maier peti-
tioned the FCC to order WTMJ-AM to provide this time, but was denied. 7
Maier then petitioned the Seventh Circuit to reverse this denial. Although the
Seventh Circuit ultimately affirmed the Commission's denial, the court con-
ferred standing on Maier, using prudential reasoning that largely mirrored ear-
lier public enforcement conceptions of standing. 8
The Seventh Circuit noted that if "Congress meant for the Commission's en-
forcement of the fairness doctrine to be subject to judicial review, it follows
that someone must have standing to bring an appeal in a particular case in
which the Commission refuses to find a fairness doctrine violation."59 The
court further noted that "it seems well established that conventional principles
of standing are inappropriate in the unique context of broadcast regulation."6
Thus, the Seventh Circuit explicitly embraced a theory of FCC exceptionalism.
As the court concluded, "the concept of standing in the context of broadcast
regulation is different from that applied in other contexts, because it is the in-
53 See discussion supra Part I1.
54 Maier v. FCC, 735 F.2d 220, 229 (7th Cir. 1984).
55 Id. at 229.
56 See, e.g., Ill. Citizens Comm. for Broad. v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
57 Maier, 735 F.2d at 232 n.17.
58 Id. at 229-30.
59 Id. at 227.
60 Id. at 228.
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terests of an amorphous, disorganized group called 'the listening public' that
are at stake." 6' As a result, "a direct, concrete, particularized injury is unneces-
sary for a party to have standing as a representative of the public interest."
62
In Llerandi v. FCC,6 the D.C. Circuit appeared to embrace the Seventh Cir-
cuit's view, but in a manner that more directly accounted (at least rhetorically)
for the Supreme Court's assertion of Article II's injury in fact requirement.
Lierandi arose after the Llerandis, a married couple, defaulted on an agreement
to purchase an AM radio station in Puerto Rico.' The station licensee subse-
quently sought FCC approval to assign the station's license to a third party.65
The Llerandis, still hoping to acquire the station themselves, filed a petition to
deny the assignment on the grounds that it would violate the Commission's
local radio ownership rules.66 Notwithstanding, the FCC's Audio Services Di-
vision approved the assignment.67
The petitioners then appealed to the D.C. Circuit. The FCC argued that the
petitioners lacked standing as they had not alleged any particularized injury to
their interests as required by the Article III case or controversy requirement.68
The petitioners maintained that they were injured in their capacities as listen-
ers.69 The court agreed, and held that the petitioners had standing as listeners to
challenge the FCC's determinations under the local radio ownership rules."°
The court reasoned that the petitioners' uncontested status as listeners "ex pro-
prio vigore [of its own accord] establishes the requisite injury necessary to sat-
isfy the strictures of Article III."" The court concluded that "[l]isteners are, by
definition, 'injured' when licenses are issued in contravention of the policies
undergirding the duopoly rule." 2
Both Maier and Lierandi appeared to differentiate listener standing from
other forms of standing under Article IlI, albeit under different theories. Maier
61 Id. at 229.
62 Id.
63 863 F.2d 79 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
64 Id. at 81.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 83.
67 Id. at 84-85.
68 Id. at 85. The FCC argued that, at the agency level, the Llerandis had alleged injury
only in their capacity as former station owners and, therefore, could not allege standing as
listeners before the court. Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 85-86.
7 Id. at 85. The affidavit of Pablo Llerandi stated that he resided within the listening
area of the radio station. Id. at 83 n.2. The FCC did not dispute that Llerandi lived in the
area but argued that he could not use the listener standing argument and that even if he used
the argument, it should fail. Id. at 84-86.
72 Id. at 85. It is important to note that the opinion used quotes around the word "in-
jury," apparently acknowledging that the injury was somewhat artificial.
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embraced a theory of "broadcast exceptionalism," finding that the "public en-
forcement model" was both particularly suited and necessary in the broadcast-
ing context. In contrast, the D.C. Circuit in Llerandi recognized automatic
standing for listeners after finding that listeners were automatically injured by
the illicit actions of broadcasters. Llerandi posited that a violation of the
Commission's rules necessarily resulted in injury, thereby acknowledging that
injury was a prerequisite to a party's standing. Thus, Llerandi was, at least
formally, responsive to the Supreme Court's analysis in Data Processing and
Sierra Club, while at the same time permitting the D.C. Circuit to retain lis-
tener standing as a viable doctrine in the context of the Article III injury re-
quirement.
C. Listener Standing and the Lujan Revolution
Data Processing, Sierra Club, and Valley Forge indicated a definite trend in
the Supreme Court's standing jurisprudence. Cumulatively, these cases sharply
limited broad "public enforcement" justifications for standing. The true
deathblow to the "public enforcement" model, however, was the 1992 case
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.73 Lujan arose when the Defenders of Wildlife
("Defenders") and several other environmental groups challenged regulations
promulgated by the Department of the Interior, which loosened the environ-
mental responsibilities of government agencies undertaking overseas projects.74
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the Defenders, as a
third party interested in the preservation of endangered animals overseas, could
establish standing under Article M."
The Defenders argued that they had suffered injury in fact because their
members traveled overseas to areas affected by the new regulations and
planned to travel to those areas in the future.76 The Court squarely rejected this
logic, finding that the Defenders had failed to assert a sufficiently imminent
injury in fact to establish Article III standing. While this result was hardly sur-
prising given the Court's earlier cases, the Court's delineation of Article III
standing requirements fundamentally reshaped judicial conceptions of Article
73 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
74 Id. at 555. The new rule provided that government agencies would only be required to
consult with the Department of the Interior, pursuant to the Endangered Species Act, when
engaged in projects in the United States and on the high seas. Effectively, then, the rule
provided government agencies with greater flexibility to engage in projects overseas. Id.
(citing 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1988)). The Defenders sought a declaratory judgment that
the new rule incorrectly interpreted the geographic scope of the relevant section of the Act.
Id. at 559.
75 Id. at 559-67.
76 Id. at 563.
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Ill standing and its constitutionally-dictated requirements. Specifically, the
Court explained that the "irreducible constitutional minimum" of the case or
controversy standing requirement has three essential elements: injury in fact,
causation, and redressibility."
The Court further explained that in order to establish an injury in fact--or
"invasion of a legally protected interest"-a plaintiff must suffer a "concrete
and particularized" and "actual or imminent" injury. Mere "conjectural or hy-
pothetical" injuries would not suffice." To be particularized, "the injury must
affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way."79 Of critical importance
was the Court's explanation that "[i]ndividual rights within the meaning of this
passage, do not mean public rights that have been legislatively pronounced to
belong to each individual who forms a part of the public.""°
The Court also noted that the burden to establish an injury in fact is mark-
edly higher when the injury arises from a third party challenging the govern-
ment's regulation of "someone else"-as opposed to the government's direct
regulation of a party.8 ' "[W]hen the plaintiff is not himself the object of the
government action or inaction he challenges, standing is not precluded, but it is
ordinarily 'substantially more difficult' to establish."82 The Court concluded
that the Defenders had not asserted a valid injury in fact because they had
failed to show that members would suffer particularized or imminent injury. 3
In the Court's estimation, the members' plans to travel overseas were far too
speculative and conjectural to satisfy the injury in fact requirement regardless
of whether they had visited overseas in the past.84
The Court also refused to rest standing on the "citizen suit" provision of the
Endangered Species Act, finding that while Congress can create a cause of ac-
tion, it cannot delegate to individuals broad power to vindicate public rights, or
77 Id. at 560-61.
78 Id. at 560.
79 Id. at 560 n.1. "[T]he injury in fact test requires more than an injury to a cognizable
interest. It requires the party seeking review be himself among the injured." Id. at 563.
80 Id. at 578 (emphasis added); see also Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an
Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 881, 894 (1983).
("[S]tanding roughly restricts courts to their traditional undemocratic role of protecting in-
dividuals and minorities against impositions of the majority, and excludes them from the
even more undemocratic role of prescribing how the other two branches should function in
order to serve the interest of the majority itself.").
81 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561-62.
82 Id. at 562.
83 Id. at 562-67. Justice Scalia noted but rejected the members' argument that their par-
ticular interest in wildlife preservation granted them standing. Id. at 563-64.
84 Id. at 563-64 ("[S]ome day intentions [to travel]-without any description of con-
crete plans, or indeed even any specification of when the some day will be-do not support
a finding of the 'actual or imminent' injury that our cases require.").
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define by statute conduct sufficient to create a cognizable injury.85 Similarly,
Congress cannot authorize administrative agencies to manufacture injury. In so
concluding, the Court emphasized the separation of powers, noting that the
vindication of the generalized public interest is the province of the legislative
and executive branches, not the courts. 6 Thus, Lujan once again explicitly re-
jected the "public enforcement" model of standing in which listener standing
had been based. The Court also, in effect, concluded that Congress cannot es-
tablish any particular industries for exceptional treatment, disposing of Maier's
premise.
D. Listener Standing Clings to Life
The D.C. Circuit had its first post-Lujan opportunity to analyze listener
standing in the context of a broadcast indecency complaint. In Branton v.
FCC,8 a listener petitioned the court to review a Commission ruling in which
the agency refused to take action against National Public Radio ("NPR") for
allegedly broadcasting "obscene, indecent, or profane language in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1464. "88 The petitioner, Peter Branton, had listened to a broadcast
containing language that he found offensive and filed a complaint with the
Mass Media Bureau seeking sanctions against NPR. 9 The Bureau rejected the
complaint after concluding that the broadcast was "not actionably indecent"
under the provisions of the statute. Branton appealed to the full Commission,
which issued a brief letter affirming the Mass Media Bureau's decision. The
Commission explained that the broadcast was an essential part of a bona fide
news story and expressed its "longstanding reluctance to intervene in the edito-
85 Id. at 573-74. It is ironic that the Court relied on Article III standing doctrine, ini-
tially intended to insulate congressional initiatives from judicial interference, to curtail the
power of Congress to expand the jurisdiction of the courts through "citizen suit" provisions.
Id. at 571-73. Some scholars have criticized Lujan and its progeny on this basis. Id. at 572;
see also RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 16.4 (4th ed. 2002).
86 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572; see also Common Cause v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 108 F.3d
413 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that a civil suit provision did not create an automatic injury in
all citizens, because Article III required parties to establish particular discrete injury). In
Common Cause, the D.C. Circuit dismissed the challenge of a Federal Election Commission
ruling that rejected allegations of violations of federal election law by a political action
group. Id. at 415. The court reasoned that "Congress cannot, consistent with Article III,
create standing by conferring 'upon all persons . . . an abstract, self-contained, noninstru-
mental right to have the Executive observe the procedures required by law'...." Id. at 418
(quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573).
87 993 F.2d 906 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
88 The allegedly indecent language occurred in an early evening broadcast of the show
"All Things Considered." The show ran a report on John Gotti, the alleged leader of an or-
ganized crime syndicate, which featured a tape recording of a wiretapped phone conversa-




rial judgments of broadcast licensees on how best to present serious public af-
fairs programming to their listeners."9 Branton then petitioned the D.C. Circuit
for review of the agency's decision.9
The D.C. Circuit held that the petitioner lacked standing to seek review of
the Commission's ruling because he had failed to establish sufficient injury in
fact that was "fairly traceable" to the Commission's conduct and redressable
by the relief requested.92
The court noted that the allegedly indecent broadcast had already occurred,
and as such, injunctive relief could neither prevent nor repair any harm done.
Thus, the court implicitly found that a case or controversy had not arisen be-
cause the judicial power could not redress the injury claimed; a non-
redressable injury was no injury at all, at least for standing purposes. As the
court reasoned:
While an offense to one's sensibilities may indeed constitute an injury ... a discrete, past
injury cannot establish the standing of a complainant, such as Branton, who seeks neither
damages nor other relief for that harm, but instead requests the imposition of a sanction in
the hope of influencing another's future behavior. 93
The court further found that any claim of ongoing or imminent injury stem-
ming from the decreased deterrent value of the Commission's rules does not
provide sufficient grounds for Article III standing due to its marginal and
speculative nature.
Interestingly, however, the D.C. Circuit did not directly confront whether
listener standing met the Article III threshold. Rather, the court rejected the
petitioner's reliance on listener standing in this specific context because he
could not establish an ongoing or imminent injury in fact that would justify the
injunctive relief he sought.94 The D.C. Circuit did not question the continuing
validity of United Church of Christ, but instead attempted to distinguish it
from Branton on two grounds. First, the court again noted that the Branton
petitioner had not asserted "a continuing pattern of inappropriate ... broadcast-
ing, which the FCC ...had in effect extended," as was the case in United
Church of Christ. " Second, the court noted the Supreme Court's consistent
reliance on the "immediacy" element of the injury in fact requirement since
United Church of Christ and suggested that "[United Church of Christ] must
be understood as a creature of the context from which it arose, viz. a license
renewal proceeding, which is inherently future oriented." 96 The D.C. Circuit
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 908-12; see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
93 Branton, 993 F.2d at 909.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 910.
96 Id.
[Vol. 14
What is Left of Listener Standing?
thus limited the holding of United Church of Christ, but the case remained
good law.
Five years later in Jaramillo v. FCC,97 the D.C. Circuit again rejected a
standing claim premised on a theory of listener standing, without rejecting the
theory itself. This time, the court focused on the "redressability" prong of the
Lujan test. In Jaramillo, Press Broadcasting Company ("Press") filed an appli-
cation to assign its license for WTKS-FM to Paxson Broadcasting of Orlando,
L.P. The petitioners urged the Commission to deny this application, alleging
that Press had deceived the Commission in a previous transaction and therefore
the assignment should be delayed until the Commission could resolve this
claim under the Commission's "Jefferson Radio" policy.98 The Audio Services
Division dismissed the petition to deny and granted Press's transfer application
and the Commission denied review. Petitioners appealed to the D.C. Circuit,
asserting standing as listeners of WTKS-FM 9
The court began its analysis by assuming "arguendo that petitioners may
have suffered a cognizable injury from being within listening range of a radio
station held by a licensee that acquired the station in violation of the FCC's
standards of candor."'' 0 However, the court then found this past injury insuffi-
cient to support the standing of petitioners, who did not seek damages for their
injuries. Citing Branton, the court concluded that "[i]f a petitioner cannot ob-
tain compensation to himself for a past injury, he has failed to show its re-
dressability," and thus failed to satisfy Lujan's three-prong standing thresh-
old.'
0 l
The D.C. Circuit again maintained that United Church of Christ and Ller-
andi were still good law, albeit distinguishable law. This time, the court fo-
cused on the types of harm at issue, noting that in United Church of Christ and
Llerandi the court had recognized "listener standing to object to Commission
decisions that would create or extend some arguably program-impairing cir-
cumstance, such as a duopoly ... or a renewal of a license for a firm guilty of
97 162 F.3d 675 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
98 Id.; see Jefferson Radio Co. v. FCC, 340 F.2d 781, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1964) ("It is the
recognized policy of the Commission that assignment of a broadcast authorization will not
be considered until the Commission has determined that the assignor has not forfeited the
authorization."). The FCC describes the "Jefferson Radio" policy as a "long-held Commis-
sion policy" under which "a transfer or assignment application cannot be granted when there
are 'unresolved issues' concerning the seller's basic qualifications." The policy "applies to
issues that, if proved, could result in the loss of operating authority or denial of a pending
application." In re Application of Mark R. Nalbone, Receiver (Assigner) for Assignment of
License of Television Station KFNB (Channel 20), Casper, Wyoming, Memorandum Opin-
ion and Order, 6 F.C.C.R. 7529 7 (Dec. 12, 1991).
99 Jaramillo, 162 F.3d at 676-77.




broadcast policy violations."" 2 The court noted that no such circumstance was
present in Jaramillo as the alleged misconduct involved a broadcaster that no
longer held its license and "the outcome-transfer of the license to another-is
exactly the same as would eventuate if the Commission held up the assign-
ment. The court found that Press was not qualified and took away its li-
cense."1"3 The court also rejected any claim that future injury would result from
the marginal weakening of the deterrent effects of the Commission's rules,
concluding that "if such a weak and indirect effect were enough, listeners any-
where could challenge any underenforcement of the policy."'"
In Huddy v. FCC,"°s the D.C. Circuit reached a similar conclusion, this time
focusing on the causation prong of the Lujan test. Petitioner John D. Huddy
was the former licensee of TV station KADY. KADY was involuntarily trans-
ferred to a bankruptcy trustee, who in turn auctioned the station." 6 John Cobb
emerged as the highest bidder for KADY and the trustee agreed to assign the
station license to Cobb. 7 Cobb assigned his purchase rights to Biltmore
Broadcasting Corporation, of which he was the controlling principal, and Bilt-
more applied for Commission approval of the license assignment.0 Huddy,
embroiled in a dispute with his bankruptcy trustee, filed a petition to deny ar-
guing that Cobb was unfit to serve as a Commission licensee. Specifically,
Huddy alleged that Cobb misrepresented his qualifications to the Commission
and argued that he was not financially qualified to serve as a licensee." 9 After
considering responses from both Cobb and the trustee, the Commission ap-
proved the purchase without a hearing. Huddy appealed to the D.C. Circuit,
seeking review of the Commission's determination."
The court began by reviewing the three prongs of the Lujan test and quickly
concluded that "[a]s a resident of the service area and a viewer of the station,
Huddy can assert a possible injury to a legally protected interest."' l. However,
the court then found that Huddy's viewer standing theory could not satisfy the
causation requirement for Article III standing because Huddy had not linked




105 236 F.3d 720 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
106 Id. at 721-22. John Huddy was the sole shareholder in Riklis Broadcasting Corpora-
tion. Riklis entered into involuntary bankruptcy and a trustee was appointed to manage the
corporation's estate. The FCC consented to the involuntary transfer of the license to the
trustee who then auctioned the station.
107 Id.
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dictions about Cobb's likely programming decisions."" 2 While conceding that
the Commission had presumably adopted its financial regulations because of
their favorable long-run effects on broadcasting, the court concluded that "the
authority of the Commission to apply such sanctions doesn't ipso facto support
an inference that FCC underenforcement of financial integrity policies is likely
to cause the sort of 'material impairment of [a viewer's] hopes or expectations'
that is needed to support standing.""' 3 In other words, even if the Commission's
financial regulations had an actual net-positive effect on programming-related
conduct by FCC licensees, it did not necessarily follow that the violation of
those regulations would cause harm that was sufficient to qualify as an Article
III injury in fact.
The court further suggested that the causation threshold was unlikely to be
met where the regulations at issue were not directly targeted at achieving qual-
ity or diversity of programming content."' Again, the D.C. Circuit distin-
guished United Church of Christ and Llerandi. This time, the court focused on
the precise nature of the regulations at issue, drawing a finer distinction be-
tween regulations targeted at programming-related conduct and those merely
affecting such conduct. Specifically, the court noted that United Church of
Christ and Llerandi involved regulations designed to "give a fair and balanced
presentation of controversial issues"" 5 and enhance "diversification of view-
points"--both directly related to programming activity."6 Thus, while the D.C.
Circuit continued to maintain that United Church of Christ and Llerandi were
good law, the court also demonstrated that they were of limited utility as
precedent for widely-applicable listener standing.
In sum, regardless of whether the D.C. Circuit intended or recognized the
result, Branton, Jaramillo, and Huddy sharply limited the applicability of the
listener standing doctrine. Those cases leveraged the three parts of the Lujan
test for Article III standing-injury in fact, causation, and redressability-and
found listener standing wanting with respect to each dimension as applied to
the specific facts at issue. While the D.C. Circuit did not directly challenge the
holdings in United Church of Christ or Llerandi, the court did substantially
limit the implications of these decisions. No longer could any listener invoke
United Church of Christ or Llerandi to support any petition for review. Bran-
ton eliminated previous injury as a basis for listener standing and firmly estab-
lished that future injuries would need to be both likely and imminent in order
to support standing. Jaramillo confirmed Branton and further required that the
112 Id.
"13 Id. at 722-23 (quoting Jaramillo v. FCC, 162 F.3d 675, 677 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).
1"4 Id. at 723.
"5 Id. at 723 (quoting United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 998 (D.C. Cir.
1966)).
116 Llerandi v. FCC, 863 F.2d 79, 85 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
20061
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
ongoing or future injury be a "program-related impairment" redressable by
judicial action. Huddy further narrowed the scope of cases in which a listener
standing theory would be viable by requiring not only that the claimed injury
be programming-related, but also that the substantive regulations at issue be
aimed directly at the improvement of programming.
In short, these cases demonstrate Lujan's dramatic impact on listener stand-
ing doctrine, which was clear, yet unacknowledged by the D.C. Circuit. Lis-
tener standing, grounded as it was in United Church of Christ and Llerandi,
survived. However, the listener standing doctrine was a mere shell of what it
had once been.
IV. SIERRA CLUB V. EPA: PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS TO
ESTABLISH STANDING
The D.C. Circuit's 2002 decision in Sierra Club v. EPA" 7 complicated a
party's ability to establish standing-listener standing or otherwise. Sierra
Club arose in the context of environmental regulation after the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") enacted a new rule defining hazardous wastewater
conditions pursuant to the Resource Conservation Recovery Act." 8 The Sierra
Club petitioned the D.C. Circuit to review the new rule and attempted to estab-
lish standing by arguing that some of the Sierra Club's members lived, worked,
and participated in recreational activities in communities that would be ad-
versely affected by the EPA's new rule."9 The Sierra Club supported its claim
with an expert declaration, maps, and mailing addresses of the affected mem-
bers who had decided to forgo recreational activities in waters near sludge pro-
ducing plants "due to their concern over exposure."'20
The court seized the opportunity to explicitly detail the relevant burdens and
standards of proof implicated by the petitioner's attempt to establish standing.
After reiterating the three-pronged Lujan test for standing, the court examined
the sufficiency of the Sierra Club's evidentiary showing on the standing issue.
The court started with the premise that a party's burden of production in estab-
lishing standing should vary according to the procedural context of the case,
and should track the burdens attached to the underlying substantive claims. 2'
The court then observed that
a petitioner seeking review in the court of appeals does not ask the court merely to assess
the sufficiency of its legal theory. Rather, like a plaintiff moving the district court for
summary judgment, the petitioner is asking the court of appeals for a final judgment in the
"17 292 F.3d 895 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
118 Id. at 896-97; see 42 U.S.C. § 6903 (2000); 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.1 l(a)(1)-(3) (2005).
119 Sierra Club, 292 F.3d at 898.
120 Id. at 901-02 (internal quotations omitted).
121 Id. at 898.
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merits, based upon the application of its legal theory to facts established by evidence in the
record .. . .[T]he petitioner must either identify in that record evidence sufficient to sup-
port its standing to seek review or, if there is none because standing was not an issue before
the agency, submit additional evidence to the court of appeals.
22
The court further determined that a petitioner's burden of proof with respect
to standing should be roughly equivalent to that of the plaintiff attempting to
survive a motion for summary judgment. Thus, a petitioner must show a "sub-
stantial probability" of injury.'23
The court recognized that, in practice, a petitioner's standing to seek review
would often be self-evident or provable by the record alone, particularly when
the petitioner is a party to the underlying administrative proceeding.' 24 How-
ever, in other cases, the underlying record would fail to demonstrate judicial
standing on its face, especially given the relatively lax requirements for admin-
istrative standing before many agencies. In such instances, the court found that
a petitioner must "supplement the record to the extent necessary to explain and
substantiate its entitlement to judicial review.
'' 25
This procedural mechanism limits the types of third-party petitioners who
may claim standing to challenge administrative action before the courts. As
third parties rarely take center stage in the underlying proceeding, the adminis-
trative record often does not demonstrate these parties' judicial standing. Con-
sequently, these parties are normally forced to establish standing de novo, ac-
cording to the rigorous procedural and evidentiary requirements of Sierra
Club. Faced with such barriers, third-party petitioners often fail. Such was the
fate of the Sierra Club; the court ultimately concluded that the documents sub-
mitted by the club failed to establish a "substantial probability" of injury to a
single member of the organization and dismissed the action accordingly.'
26
V. RECENT TREATMENT OF LISTENER STANDING
The D.C. Circuit had its first opportunity to apply Sierra Club to listener
standing in Rainbow/PUSH Coalition v. FCC ("Rainbow/PUSH 1,,).27 In
Rainbow/PUSH I, the court addressed the required evidentiary showing to es-
tablish that "listener standing" could be appropriately conferred on a given
party. In doing so, the court flatly rejected any notion of automatic listener
standing. But Rainbow/PUSH I and subsequent cases have done little to clarify
122 Id. at 899.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 899-900.
125 Id. at 900.
126 Id. at 902. The lists of addresses were legally insignificant because the Sierra Club
failed to establish that any of the members would actually be affected in the future by the
new rule. Id at 901-02.
127 330 F.3d 539 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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the status of the doctrine. Indeed, if anything, these cases have succeeded only
in increasing confusion.
Rainbow/PUSH I arose after Sullivan Broadcast Holdings applied for ap-
proval to transfer control of several television stations to Sinclair Broadcasting
Group, Inc. ("Sinclair") and Glencairn, Ltd. ("Glencairn"). In response, the
Rainbow/PUSH Coalition ("Rainbow") filed a petition to deny, claiming that
Sinclair and Glencairn were commonly controlled and the proposed transfer
would violate the Commission's then-existing duopoly rule. The Commission
credited certain of Rainbow's claims but found that the parties had acted in
good faith and therefore granted the transfer application subject to certain revi-
sions in the associated transfer agreements. Rainbow appealed to the D.C. Cir-
cuit."'
Rainbow claimed judicial standing based on a theory of "automatic audience
standing," interpreting United Church of Christ and Llerandi to support the
proposition that "[w]hen the FCC permits the transfer of a license to a party
that will not operate in the public interest, the FCC causes injury to the sta-
tion's audience sufficient to create standing."'29 Predictably, the D.C. Circuit
rejected this interpretation, citing Lujan's three-pronged test and Sierra Club's
pleading requirements to demonstrate that, under Article III, standing was any-
thing but automatic. 3 ° The court, relying heavily on Sierra Club, dismissed the
claim for lack of standing after finding that Rainbow had failed to establish
sufficient injury in fact. 3' The court further suggested that "[i]f there were no
more to standing than [being a member of the general listening public] ... then
the 'irreducible constitutional minimum' [required by Lujan] would be irre-
ducible only because it could not be any smaller and still be said to exist."'32
The court appeared to deal a deathblow to traditional interpretations of both
United Church of Christ and Llerandi. However, the D.C. Circuit decided not
to overturn either case, choosing instead to distinguish them on their facts. The
court stressed that in United Church of Christ, the petitioners had established a
strong, documented pattern of abuse and harm that was concrete and particu-
larized, such that "[i]t was perfectly clear that the appellants would be injured,
and substantially so, by the grant of the renewal license."'33 Presumably, this
evidence would have easily satisfied the petitioners' burden under Sierra Club
and Lujan. On the other hand, the court found that Rainbow had made only
broad and conclusory accusations, such that its burden remained unfulfilled.'34
128 Id. at 540-42.




133 Id. at 543.
134 Id.
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The court's requirement that listeners meet the specified burdens of produc-
tion and proof at once eliminated any notion that listener standing was auto-
matic as suggested by Llerandi. The court reinterpreted United Church of
Christ to stand not for the proposition that listeners would always have stand-
ing to challenge Commission decisions that impacted the quality of program-
ming, but simply that listeners could potentially have standing to do so. The
court claimed that United Church of Christ did not "purport to apply a more
relaxed standard to audience members than to other litigants seeking to demon-
strate standing under Article III.""' In effect, the court reduced listener stand-
ing to a descriptive concept denoting a class of litigants who could have stand-
ing if actually injured, rather than an enlargement of Article Ill standing doc-
trine.
The court's attempt to distinguish Llerandi proved even more revisionist.
The court first noted that "Llerandi was a case in which the petitioners were
'invok[ing] and press[ing] the duopoly rule' itself."'36 Thus, in the court's esti-
mation, the critical feature of Llerandi was that the petitioners challenged
Commission action that they claimed had actually resulted in an ongoing viola-
tion of the Commission's rules. The court noted Llerandi's pronouncement that
"[l]isteners are, by definition, 'injured' when licenses are issued in contraven-
tion of the policies undergirding the duopoly rule."'37 But the court distin-
guished Rainbow/PUSH I because the relevant duopoly rule had since been
rescinded. As such, the Commission's decision to grant the applications at is-
sue did not violate current Commission rules.'
This reading of Lierandi is tenuous at best; the standing principle enunciated
in the case simply cannot be reconciled with the standing rules set forth in
Lujan. Lierandi explicitly states that the FCC's duopoly rule creates a legally
cognizable interest in all listeners such that when the rule is violated there is
injury by definition.'39 That is exactly what Lujan says Congress (and thus ad-
ministrative agencies) cannot do: define by statute an injury that can be vindi-
cated by a member of the public without any showing that he himself was in-
jured in a personal and concrete way. Lierandi does not merely say that the
FCC's former duopoly rule made the de facto harm resulting from excessive
media concentration into a legally cognizable injury. It says that every person
in the affected market is automatically deemed to suffer that injury in a per-
sonal and concrete manner when the rule is violated. By abandoning the re-
quirement that a plaintiff prove that he suffered a discrete personal injury,
135 Id.
136 Id. at 545; see also Llerandi v. FCC, 863 F.2d 79, 85 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
13 Llerandi, 863 F.2d at 85.




Llerandi's standing principle violates Lujan's important restrictions on the
power of Congress and Executive Branch agencies to create standing to chal-
lenge administrative action. 4 °
Two recent cases have provided further evidence of the court's reluctance to
overturn its precedent even at the expense of jurisprudential integrity. KERM,
Inc. v. FCC arose after KERM, an operator of several radio stations in Arkan-
sas, filed a formal complaint with the Commission claiming that KAYH-FM,
another Arkansas station, had impermissibly aired eleven underwriting an-
nouncements during a football game in violation of the Commission's com-
mercial advertising rules. 4' The FCC's Enforcement Bureau found that ten of
the eleven disputed announcements did not violate the Act. The FCC further
determined that no enforcement action was warranted for the remaining viola-
tion because it was an "isolated occurrence." 4 KERM appealed to the Com-
mission, but the Commission upheld the Bureau's decision.'43 KERM subse-
quently filed a petition for review before the D.C. Circuit.'"
Relying heavily on its previous listener standing decisions, the court held
that KERM lacked standing to challenge the Commission's order.4 ' After first
noting the station's failure to properly plead standing in its opening brief, 146 the
court concluded that "KERM cannot prevail on a theory of listener standing
because it challenges only a discrete, past injury and alleges no continuing vio-
lations."'47 Citing Branton and Jaramillo, the court simply noted that KERM
had alleged no continuing injury as required by Article III and as such had no
standing to petition the courts for review.'48 Again, the court distinguished
United Church of Christ on the basis of its facts, firmly situating United
Church oJ Christ and listener standing within general Article III standing re-
quirements.'49
140 See Am. Legal Found. v. FCC, 808 F.2d 84, 89 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("Congress cannot
stautorily [sic] remove or diminish the constitutional limits on which standing is based.").
141 353 F.3d 57, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The Communications Act of 1934 prohibits non-
commercial educational broadcast stations from broadcasting "advertisements." 47 U.S.C. §
399b(b)(2) (2000). The Act defines advertisements as program material that is broadcast "in
exchange for any remuneration ... intended to promote any service, facility, or product" of
for profit entities. Id. § 399b(a)(1).
142 KERM, 353 F.3d at 59.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 59-60.
146 Id. "Where no motion to dismiss has been made, the petitioner's first opportunity will
be its opening brief, not its reply brief." Id. (citing Sierra Club v. EPA, 292 F.3d 895 (D.C.
Cir. 2002)). KERM missed its opportunity to assert evidence of standing. Id. at 60.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 See also Nat'l Hispanic Policy Inst. v. FCC, No. 03-1358, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS
16393 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 9, 2004) (per curiam) (dismissing appellant's petition after appel-
lant's failure to submit timely evidence of standing).
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While the court avoided a head-on confrontation with United Church of
Christ, it did suggest that United Church of Christ might be entirely inapplica-
ble to the Article Ill context. In Rainbow/PUSH I, the court stated that it would
treat United Church of Christ as applicable to the judicial context even though
the decision technically concerned the listeners/petitioners' standing to appear
before the Commission under § 309(d) of the Communications Act. The
KERM court, however, prefaced its analysis of United Church of Christ as fol-
lows: "Even assuming that [United Church of Christ] is applicable to our
analysis of KERM's constitutional standing[.]" This strongly implies that the
court was leaning toward the opposite interpretation-that United Church of
Christ did not apply to the judicial context.15 ° While the court has not clarified
the correct application of United Church of Christ, the wholesale removal of
the decision from the Article III context would seem to largely settle any ques-
tions about the viability of listener standing.
The court's most recent "last word" on listener standing arose in Rain-
bow/PUSH Coalition v. FCC ("Rainbow/PUSH I1").SI in early 2005. Rain-
bow/PUSH II involved a renewal application filed by the University of Mis-
souri, licensee of noncommercial educational FM station KWMU, which was
granted by the Commission despite allegations of discrimination raised by
Rainbow. Again, Rainbow claimed standing on the basis of listener standing,
and again, the court soundly rejected this independent theory of standing under
Article III. While hardly revolutionary, Rainbow/PUSH II did solidify the
court's benign indifference to the listener standing doctrine. So long as the
doctrine remains ineffective, the court appears to be in no rush to explicitly
eliminate it.
VI. WHAT IS LEFT OF LISTENER STANDING?
This article has tracked the evolution of the D.C. Circuit's listener standing
doctrine over the past forty years. The D.C. Circuit has performed wonders of
textual manipulation, gradually and sometimes stealthily eroding the original
doctrine of listener standing while still maintaining that United Church of
Christ and Llerandi are "good law" (albeit law that seems inapplicable in most
circumstances and entirely redundant). By and large, this erosion has gone un-
noticed; indeed, practitioners still cite United Church of Christ without refer-
ence to the court's subsequent case law oblivious to the last forty years of
standing jurisprudence.
150 Id.




A cynic might see a perverse genius in the court's sleight of hand. A more
forgiving observer might question whether the court's actions reveal a linger-
ing allegiance to a doctrine that it sees as necessary to the public interest. Per-
haps the D.C. Circuit is simply unwilling to eliminate listener standing because
the court believes the doctrine to be good policy, albeit policy that is contrary
to Lujan and beyond the power of the courts to impose or enforce in light of
Supreme Court precedence. Alternately, the court's treatment of listener stand-
ing may simply be a manifestation of its deep institutional tendency to respect
its own precedent.
The nature of the broadcast medium poses a great challenge to any listener
seeking to plead the requisite injury to establish standing in an Article III court.
To challenge a license renewal, grant, modification, assignment or transfer, or
the underenforcement of rules such as those involving indecency, a petitioner
must show that the FCC's action will result in actual, ongoing harm. Showing
that one is harmed by a television or radio program would be difficult itself;
but showing that the FCC's failure to sanction or its decision to license is
likely to cause actual future harm is even more difficult. The question of
whether the D.C. Circuit will adhere to its decision in Lierandi thus takes on
added importance: listeners will not be able to establish standing in almost any
case unless the court continues to credit some sort of presumed injury from
rule violations as it did in Llerandi.
The Llerandi principle of presumed injury is no longer tenable. Ultimately,
the court's hand is forced by Lujan. The inescapable fact is that the D.C. Cir-
cuit's opinion is, of necessity, subordinated to that of the Supreme Court. Un-
der such circumstances, the court's continuing claims that United Church of
Christ and Lujan are good law serve only to confuse standing jurisprudence
and undermine judicial integrity without any corresponding benefit to the pub-
lic. Accordingly, the court would do well to accept the argument that listener
standing is effectively a dead doctrine and explicitly state as much.
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